For more information:
Callie R. Oettinger, callie@o-a-inc.com
Ph: 703-451-2476, Fax: 703-451-6870

Talking Points

Determining What We Need

Pages 9–10
I learn something from every book I write, and researching What We Need has been more educational than most. My primary sources are military personnel who have left boot prints in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. Because few were willing to be identified—either from modesty, security concerns, or fear of officialdom—I have identified most individuals by pseudonyms or noms de guerre. I pledged anonymity to all who requested it, though their locales and times of service are accurate.

They cover a wide spectrum: “straight-leg” infantry; armored cavalry; airborne; rangers; Marines; and SEALs. Snipers and recon dudes; base security guys and gals; mechanics and heavy equipment operators; helicopter pilots and tactical jet crews; airlifters and electronic warfare specialists. Not to mention DoD attorneys, civilian trainers, academics, consultants, Beltway bandits, and other journalists. The ranks range from E-2 to o-6, with multiple delegates in most grades.

There was enough similarity among the response to form a reasoned opinion as to what we need. The near unanimity in some areas was astonishing: as of 2006 everybody in combat zones wants more socks, and I mean everybody. Far too many still complain about shortages of personal and vehicular armor. The fact that the United States government does not provide such basic items five years into the Global War on Terror (hereafter the Terror War) represents a freaking outrage.

Across the board, I also found wide agreement on the big items: we need more people (those we have are approaching exhaustion), more training (including ranges and ammunition), and more linguists (Arabic and Pashto for starters), plus more information.

Broke on $440 Billion

Pages 14–15
In early 2006 the Army chief of staff noted a seeming anomaly: the previous Christmas, Americans spent more on holiday gifts and decorations than was spent on the military all year long. The purported $438.5 billion amounted to less than 4 percent of the total economy.

However the military-industrial-political budget is spent, the general’s concern highlights an important point, though not the one he had in mind.

Do me a favor.

Take out your wallet and examine a dollar bill. It’s a smidgen over six inches long. Now, use your imagination and envision 440 billion greenbacks placed end to end. How far would they go?

Actually, they would extend 220 billion feet, or 41,600,000 miles. That’s 1,664 times around Planet Earth at the equator.

If the greenbacks had Andy Jackson’s picture instead of George Washington’s, that line still would run well over 2,000,000 miles. That’s about four trips to the moon and back.

So, then…

On roughly $440 billion, how is it possible that DoD lacks adequate funds?

On $440 billion, how is it possible that soldiers still lack sufficient body armor, training facilities and ammunition, and high-tech bandages?

On $440 billion, how is it possible that there is not enough money for vehicle maintenance and repair?

On $440 billion, how is it possible that GIs still write home asking folks to send socks and sheets and batteries?

The answer is painfully simple. There is lots of money for DoD. The problem is, the military-industrial-political complex often refuses to spend enough of the existing largess on the low-end, unglamorous, routine items that troops really need, or to ship the needed items to the operating areas.

Military Spending

Page 29
Some military leaders insist that we’re broke on some $450 billion per year (a little under 4 percent of the gross domestic product). Some perspective might help.

During John F. Kennedy’s administration, military spending ran around 9 percent of the GDP. In the two decades following Vietnam (1975–1994) the defense establishment absorbed slightly over 6 percent of the economy. That covered the final phase of the Cold War, and it was enough to spend the Evil Empire into the dustbin of history.

But the old ways die hard, if at all. One example:

In 2002, a year after 9-11, the Bush Administration moved to cancel the Crusader artillery piece, a huge 155mm weapon system. The proposal made sense, as Crusader was intended to fight a conventional war in Europe and had little relevance to events elsewhere. But the Army leadership joined forces with politicians from fourteen states that would build the system, insisting that the $11 billion project would continue. The Army declared Crusader to be “very important and very necessary and, as a matter of fact, an important part of transformation.”

Eventually Crusader was terminated, with part of the remaining funds being transferred to another project. But the transformation concept remained, frequently stressing equipment over personnel in search of the most bang for the buck.

Priorities

Pages 21–22
In 2005 the Air Force proposed buying a $49 million airshow gadget called Thundervision, a big-screen video and sound system for the Thunderbirds flight demonstration team. However, the concept drew unwanted attention amid charges of cronyism and undue influence among some very senior generals, both active and retired. Finally the FBI was called upon to investigate. But the legal niceties overshadowed the larger issue: why, in the midst of a shooting war, the U.S. Air Force wanted to appropriate enough irrelevant PR funds to purchase millions of gallons of jet fuel, nearly 2.5 million rounds of 20mm ammunition, or 580 Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles.

But the problem extends elsewhere.

In 2006 the Navy Office of Information’s Visual News Service released The U.S. Navy in 2005 Year in Review. It featured about one hundred high-quality images of naval activities. They included Navy personnel playing basketball, playing football (“Beat Army!”), playing music, recruiting new people, training sailors, servicing race cars, sailing ships, flying aircraft, and enjoying liberty. Over one-quarter of the images depicted disaster relief in the Pacific Ocean or the U.S. Gulf Coast.

After nearly seven minutes the video ended with the notation “…the war on terror continues.”
Think about that.

There was not one image of combat. Not one. The closest the producers came was a photo of a Medal of Honor recipient’s funeral…and a shot of the Army-Navy game.

The United States Navy’s public information office labored long and hard to produce a portrait of the service’s missions four years after 9-11…and failed to demonstrate any activities related to inflicting violence upon the nation’s enemies.

Our rating: A+ for quality; F for relevance; and F- for awareness. There was no hint of combat activity: of SEALs’ frequent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, nor of helicopter squadrons taken off ships to augment Army unites in the war zones.

Dedication

Page 23
Fill in the blanks as you wish, but a major war requires certain characteristics, starting with dedication and sacrifice from most of all of the population. The world wars fit that description; to a lesser extent so did Vietnam. The Terror War does not. The economy does not suffer overmuch, nor does the American public feel an inordinate strain. Casualties are limited to a very small portion of the populace.

Who Needs Generals?

Pages 203–204
We do not need more generals. Or admirals, for that matter. As of 2006 the Navy had some 215 admirals; the Marine Corps 100 generals. Relatively few of those officers actually command anything. Taking the Marines as a sample, 42 percent fill command positions and 14 percent hold the title of ‘director’ of an office or program. The others are deputy or assistant commanders, staff officers, or representatives to legislative and other offices.

For comparison, at the end of World War II the Marines had seventy-two generals to command 669,000 leathernecks. Today, with one-sixth of the personnel, the Corps has 52 percent more star wearers with one-third the strength. In the Navy, there are about two-thirds as many “flags”—342 in 1945 to 215 today—with barely one tenth the force structure. (However, the Navy’s WW II count is skewed by 109 commodores, a one-star position now called “rear admiral lower half.” Honest.)

Generals are uniformed politicians—they don’t pin on the stars if they don’t play the game. Nevertheless, no system is perfect and a few good ones are bound to slip through the cracks. Very few.

When you consider how many thousands of flag officers we have had since the end of World War II, it stands to reason that some of them must have disagreed with something strongly enough to dissent from the administration they served.

I know of three.

In 1949 the chief of naval operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld (a nonaviator) resigned in protest over the Truam administration’s anti-Navy bias and cancellation of the first super carrier, USS United States.

Nobody resigned during the Vietnam fiasco. Nobody. Curt LeMay might have done so had he not reached mandatory retirement in early 1965. To quote the late Marine Major General Marion Carl, some senior officers remained in place “to prevent us from doing something stupid,” but no one bucked the system at the four-star level.

In 1977 Army Major General John K. Singlaub committed de facto suicide by dissenting from Jimmy Carter’s troop reduction policy in Korea. (Subsequently, Carter expressed his regrets over the death of Kim Jong Il, who started the Korean War and killed at least 34,000 Americans.)

Twenty years later, Air Force chief Ronald Fogelman put his four stars where his ethics were. When he considered a subordinate unfairly blamed for American deaths in the Khobar Towers terrorist attack, Fogelman retired a year early in protest.

It remains an exclusive club.

Who Needs Promotions?

Pages 205–206
We need to stop promoting people so quickly.

You read it correctly. Do not promote everybody—at least not out of their position. “If they’re doing a great job, leave them there.” That’s the advice of many veterans who have seen careerism triumph at the expense of competence. Vietnam was a classic example: young captains rotated in and out of rifle companies in a matter of months, punching their professional tickets. Says one noncom who spoke for many, “Just as soon as you broke in a new CO and he was starting to learn the ropes, zip! He was gone and you’d have to start over.”

If there’s a way to change the rank structure, let’s look at it. But on the other hand, if a lieutenant colonel or Navy commander is doing a magnificent job running a critical logistics operation, why harm the unit’s efficiency and rotate him-or-her out just to check the next box for eligibility as an O-6? Hell, keep him-or-her in that job as an O-6 with suitable pay and seniority. Then when he-or-she has trained his-or-her successor, let the water walker jump to the next level.

We also need to give more of our people some credit for brains.

The conventional wisdom holds that the all-volunteer force is comprised of the best educated and smartest (not necessarily the same) personnel of all time. That may be true, but whether it is or not, there’s room for improvement.

Among most career officers, the “up or out” dilemma is unavoidable. The cycle in the Navy, for instance, has evolved (some say mutated) from warfighting to engineering to management. (Recently the Proctor and Gamble company was consulted by a board of admirals interested in learning about more efficiency in corporate management. By it self that’s not a bad idea, but somehow it’s unseemly for the United States Navy to be seen squeezing more toothpaste from the institutional tube.)

Attracting/Retaining Troops

Pages 31–32
That’s a subject of obvious concern to each branch of service, and there’s a quick way to determine what the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard offer their recruits.

If you go to the Army web site, www.army.com, you’ll notice the major sales points on the top bar: Travel, Education, and Money.

If you go to the Navy web site, you’ll notice the major sales points are Careers, Jobs, and Benefits.

If you go to the Air Force web site, you’ll notice the major sales points are Careers, Education, and Cool Stuff. (The latter involves airplanes and weapons.)
If you go to the Marine Corps web site, you’ll notice the major headings are Recruiting, Headquarters, Units, and Careers. That’s a mission-oriented menu, even if it doesn’t include Killing Our Enemies.

If you go to the Coast Guard web site, you’ll notice the major subjects are News, Missions, and Careers.

In other words, the branch with the highest degree of combat involvement and the non combat-involved service are the most mission-oriented in their recruiting emphasis. (Under ‘What the Army Does,’ it takes two paragraphs to get around to warfighting.)

By their own admission, the Army, Navy, and Air Force see careers, education, and money as the primary inducements for joining those branches. The Marines seem to attract young people who are not only willing but eager to slay the heathen while at the other end of the spectrum, the “Coasties” are equally motivated to save lives and protect our security.

Are those accurate generalizations?

For the Marines and the Coast Guard, apparently yes. For the others, it’s obviously unfair to say that all soldiers, sailors, and airmen are motivated by what the service can do for them, but institutionally that’s how the services perceive most of their recruits.

Just thought I’d mention it.

As of 2006, all the armed forces were meeting their monthly recruiting goals with the Marine Corps doing best at 112 percent. Furthermore, all branches expected to achieve their desired retention rates, as did the National Guard and Air Guard.

That’s the good news.

However, the “accession” from active to reserves was lagging badly. Including direct recruiting as well as transfer from the regulars, only three of the six components gained enough new reservists, with the Army running at 75 percent for the National Guard at 87 percent for the Reserves. The Marines, Air Force Reserves and Air Guard met their goals.

All Volunteer/Recruited/Drafted Armed Forces

Page 34
We already have a draft. Ironically (or not) it involves conscripting active-duty personnel who are eligible for separation from the service. It’s called the “stop-loss program.” It permits DoD to retain military personnel beyond their scheduled release date or retirement “for the good of the service.” It doesn’t matter whether the individuals want to remain or not.

An Army captain, a former enlisted man who went to West Point, responded to a Thomas Sowell article about the draft in 2006: ‘A draftee military is not an ideal, but neither is a volunteer force that is overextended, overworked, underpaid and used as a punch line on both sides. The current stop-loss policy in effect…is for all intents and purposes a draft, albeit an extremely selective one for targeting people who have already done their part and…wish to leave the service.’”

Page 36
Senator William Proxmire, wrote, “The fundamental argument for the volunteer Army is that it’s just, it’s fair. People are in the Army now because they want to be there. They’re not in the Army because they’re forced to be there. And in a society which is at peace, that’s the way ought to be.”

Now we’re caught somewhere between those views, committing a volunteer force to an open-ended conflict increasingly demanding troops on the ground.

(An aside is worth noting: in 1987, journalist Arthur T. Hadley observed, “To be accurate, we do not have a ‘volunteer’ armed force…We have a ‘recruited’ armed force, an important distinction.”)

Page 40
In order to make maximum use of the all-volunteer force, drafting soldiers and sailors for noncombat service would release thousands of more willing personnel for overseas deployment. In the Terror War, it is not realistic to think that we can send conscripts to Iraq, Afghanistan, or any combat zone where they will not be exposed to ambushes, rockets, mortars, and IEDs. But by employing draftees for two-year stints in the U.S. (and perhaps Europe), a more efficient use of available manpower might be obtained.

Pages 46–47
In the Pentagon game, you pays your money and you takes your chances.

Following the collapse of the Evil Empire, President Clinton and the Republican congress eagerly sought the “peace dividend.” Ignoring history and human nature, the demise of the Soviet Union was interpreted as “peace in our time”, leading to major reductions in the military. But while the Cold War force structure was dismantled, brushfires sprang up around the globe: Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia—and Kuwait. All that was before 9-11. There was an inverse relation between force reductions and deployments: the former down 40 percent; the latter up as much as 400 percent. Something had to give.

It was people: retention suffered.

Consequently, DoD sought to offset the deficit by spending more money on technology with small, more flexible combat units. Considering the 1991 world view, that might have made sense. But the world refused to co-operate.

Then came 9-11. The poles had shifted: suddenly we faced a broad-front conflict in two dissimilar arenas: Afghanistan and Iraq. We were going to need more people, not fewer, to wage a long-term campaign against a tough, committed, enemy.

Yet after 9-11, DoD continued with plans to turn the Army into a smaller, more flexible force. In the eighteen months between Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was pretty much business as usual. High-high tech gear continued eating massive portions of the defense budget to the detriment of the kind of warfighters we needed: ground troops and support personnel.

In 2004, 27 percent of active-duty forces were serving in foreign countries, a figure almost identical to the Desert Shield/Storm level. But the deployed units (as opposed to those permanently based overseas) were four to five times greater than the decade after Desert Storm, and the total personnel serving abroad was nearly 50 percent more.

In short, however, you slice or dice the numbers, the computer keeps spitting out the same result: we need more people.

Page 49
There’s something else to consider, and it receives precious little attention. Even assuming that we obtain sufficient numbers of new personnel, then what? That means we need more housing, gear, and training. There are not enough training facilities or firing ranges now (see Chapter Three). We need planning for expansion of barracks, uniforms, food, and equipment, plus weapons and ammunition.

We Need Civilians

Pages 50–52
The Defense Department has 700,000 civilian employees, so why not add some more?

Aside from administrators and clerical workers, DoD has used nonmilitary people for decades. Many of those in the most important positions are former military personnel doing the same kind of work they did in uniform. Contract maintenance is just one example, but it’s better than most.

We have an enormous pool of knowledgeable, enthusiastic civilians who are eager to contribute to the military, but the pool is largely untapped.

Other civilians are intimately involved in military operations, but strictly in the private sector. The fact is, DoD does not have enough qualified instructors or facilities to meet the needs for combat training. But for the moment, we could be making far better use of civilians across the board: career retirees, those with prior service, and probably a few million who are just interested in lending a hand. Consider the knowledge and experience among the population surrounding most military and naval facilities: computer programming, clerical and stenographic help, vehicle repair, and marksmanship training to name a few.

The Revolving Door to Combat/Reinventing the Wheel

Pages 54–55
Generally, units are assigned to a fixed term of service Over There (six months or a year) with the troops permanently assigned. Consequently, once the company, battalion, whatever learns the ropes, it’s an all-up round for “the duration.” Personnel learn the job, the working environment, and the local tricks of the trade. Additionally, the officers and NCOs learn their subordinates’ strengths and weaknesses: who can do what; who can be relied upon and who can’t.

The trouble, of course, is that when the next unit rolls in, there’s an unavoidable loss of corporate knowledge. Without some old-timers who have BTDT in that job and that locale, the new guys and gals start over. Yes, there are “turnover” and “in-chop” briefings, but even when they’re conscientiously applied, troops report that they can be cursory (“Let’s get the hell outta here”) or rendered marginally useful owing to an evolving atmosphere.

What to do?

The Army has suggested one or two ideas; I’d like to suggest another.

To its credit, in 2005–06 the Pentagon began considering an “on-off” tour for middle and upper-level officers: battalion grade and higher. The concept would place lieutenant colonels and colonels in semi-permanent billets to oversee a continuity of operational doctrine and plain old know-how. One version would put officers in-country for six months “on” and back home for those three or four “off” before repeating the cycle. For an incentive, the officers would be eligible to select their next assignment, especially career-enhancing slots such as war college. It’s worth a try.

Now let’s consider another prospect.

Since we’re engaged in an open-ended conflict likely to last decades or more, long-range planning should be possible. Ergo, shorter-term planning should pose no great challenge. Once a unit’s place in the deployment schedule is known, send one or two officers and NCOs to the unit currently in-country two or three months early. Integrate those “scouts” into the unit that’s nearing completion of its tour so there will be some corporate knowledge on the ground when the newbies roll in.

Yes, it may require longer deployments by the advance “scouts” but maybe not. Possibly rotate them home after six or twelve months and receive the next outfit’s scouts.

We Need Institutional Knowledge

Pages 201–202
Institutional knowledge vanishes at approximately the speed of light. It’s an amazing situation, probably dating at least from Varro and the III Legion in 216 BC.

Throughout American history, there exists no better example than the start of the Korean War.

In 1945 the U.S. Army stood astride the world, from Western Europe to the Western Pacific. It was a large, competent, well-trained and well-equipped force that had garnered an immense amount of knowledge and ability, defeating world-class enemies.

Yet somehow, in five short years, the United States Army forgot how to fight. The communist steamroller that left the Pyongyang station southbound in June 1950 was very nearly unstoppable. Through operating in a situation of American air supremacy, the North Korean juggernaut nearly pushed U.S. and ROK troops off the peninsula. America was handed a humiliating reversal by a second-line opponent. We need a masterful amphibious landing at Inchon to save the day.

Page 203
A decade later Vietnam came along. The same thing happened again. Because of the “ticket punching” mindset in the Army (and to an extent in the Marines), officers frequently rotated in and out of platoons, companies, and battalions. With as little as six months in command of a unit, lieutenants, captains, and lieutenant colonels rolled out, receiving the obligatory Bronze Star as an I-was-there gong. Meanwhile, the grunts—the trigger pullers at the sharp end of battle—came to rely increasingly upon non-coms. The NCOs had the ‘bush knowledge’ to fight and survive, but they had no influence upon the Army’s policies and what passed for strategy.

Hard, bloody lessons were learned, forgotten, relearned, and re-forgotten, on and on. Ad nauseum.

It’s better today. The army established the Center for Lessons Learned, with professional, lucid assessments of what works and doesn’t work. The information is there: but frequently it’s overlooked.

Before leaving the smorgasbord of suggestions detailed above, it’s only fair to consider some of the many things we do not need in the military. And right at the top of the list is star wearers.

Women in the Armed Forces

Pages 40–41
Demographers tell us that about 4,180,000 Americans turn eighteen every year. With the all-volunteer force, that figure is sufficient to maintain 1,422,000 active-duty personnel amid a total force structure of 2,360,000. In extreme emergency, there are some 135 million Americans aged seventeen to forty-nine as prospective conscripts.

Of the afore-mentioned 4,180,000 persons becoming draft-eligible each year, 52 percent are female.

Hmmm…

A new draft would require some careful scrutiny, and Job One might be women. Are We The People ready to send eighteen-year-old females into enforced military service? It’s not like other wars in which uniformed women largely stayed at home or served behind the lines. There are no lines in the Terror War: it’s aptly called The 360 Degrees War.

Page 45
Women are never going to be as strong as men. Not even the United States government can alter that elemental fact. Nor are most military women nearly as eager for combat as most males. (Few female naval aviators seem as enthused about bombing and strafing as they are about flying the space shuttle.) But in the rare instances when commanders establish a uniform standard of behavior and performance—and stick to it—the results speak for themselves.

The problem occurs when commanding officers—especially the uniformed politicians with stars on their shoulders—invoke a double standard.

Still, there are potential PR problems with women in combat. And none is more sensitive than female POWs.

Of the three Army women known captured in two Iraq wars, apparently all were raped or sexually assaulted. Those few instances—especially [Jessica] Lynch’s—generated much comment but eventually they faded from public attention. Apparently most Americans have adjusted to the likelihood of female soldiers being raped in captivity, though ironically (or not) there is far more coverage of real and alleged sexual assault on college campuses, from Duke to Annapolis.

We Need Training

Pages 61–62
None of the following is based on hearsay, internet blogs, or urban legend. There is no “anecdotal evidence.” All of it is based upon first-person observation.

I have seen graduates of military sniper schools who do not know how to use a shooting sling; who have never been allowed to do anything but single-load their rifles owing to range safety concerns.

I have seen a soldier who did not know how to load cartridges into her magazine.

I have seen a five-stripe sergeant load his magazine to capacity—with the bullets pointed to the rear.

I have seen a soldier pointed a loaded M16 at an instructor- twice.

I have met an automatic weapon instructor who has never fired the gun.

I have met a helicopter pilot bound for Iraq who had not fired a rifle or pistol in two years.

I have met an Air Force Reserve officer bound for Afghanistan who had not fired a weapon in eight years.

Pages 65–66
Listen to Warrant Officer Dave Long, a helicopter pilot training before deployment to Afghanistan, “We didn’t have enough pistol ammunition so we ran around with our Berettas, going ‘bang-bang.’ Although we’re an aviation unit, we had to train for convoy escort but there was no training ammo for the .50 calibers or Mark 19 grenade launchers. So we did like Sergeant Rock, going ‘Budda-budda’ and ‘ka-boom, ka-boom.’ It was laughable and pointless.”

That was not an isolated case. At Fort Bliss some National Guardsmen had M16 ammunition but there were too few range facilities. They waited their turn, and by the time they got to the firing line, darkness had fallen. “All we could do was function-test our rifles,” sad an NCO. “Yup, they all worked, but we had no idea where they shot. But we checked that box and off we went to war.”

Combat troops are not receiving the hands-on weapon training they need. A case in point: in 2004 Staff Sergeant David Bellavia or The Big Red One was engaged in close quarters fighting in Fallujah when he confronted several insurgents in a basement. He had a flash-bang grenade, intended to stun and disorient enemies, but he never used one before. Uncertain whether the violent sound and light would harm himself or his soldiers in that circumstance, he elected not to use it. Instead, he killed the enemy with his rifle and a personal knife.

Sergeant Bellavia has been nominated for the Medal of Honor.

Pop quiz: What do Alvin York, Samuel Woodfill, Audie Murphy, and Charles P. Murray have in common?

Partial answer: They have all received the Medal of Honor.

Full answers; among millions of others, they also learned how to shoot as civilians.

Lesson to be learned: we need more recruits who know how to shoot before they report for basic training. But assuming that marksmanship becomes a national goal (a huge assumption), how could we accomplish it?”

Do-It-Yourself Training

Page 70
Not surprisingly, criticism of DoD training priorities is resented by many military instructors (and students, for that matter). But ask yourself: if the armed forces are adequately funding weapons training, why is there a backlog of military units and individuals at so many civilian shooting schools?

I’ll let one civilian instructor speak for many.

Among the most active civilian trainers is William Graves who manages the McMillan Rifles sniper school in Arizona. His classes have been full for the past several years.

“The military snipers schools can fail 40 to 60 percent of their students. They see that as keeping up the quality of their programs, but they’re always short of the numbers they need. That’s why we have a full schedule: our classes are 100 percent shooting. There’s no time for physical training, no politically correct programs, and not much admin down time. Trigger time is what counts.”

We should not think that the military fails to provide basic firearms instruction to its personnel. Every recruit receives some degree of familiarization and initial qualification.

However, in far too many cases the soldier/airman/whatever is not allowed to perform basic tasks: loading cartridges in magazines (they’re issued pre-loaded for accounting purposes); clearing malfunctions (that’s what instructors are for), or even zeroing the weapon properly (it’s done on 25-meter laser ranges). Troops shoot an acceptable score on indoor ranges and walk away thinking they’re ready for a rifle fight.

Says “Darren,” The National Guard instructor, “We’re still sending people to war who don’t know how to defend themselves. It was bad enough with Jessica Lynch’s unit in 2003. In 2006 it’s a (bleeping) outrage.”

Page 71
He was a stocky, icy, red-headed Marine who knew everything worth knowing about rifle shooting. He trained his Raiders to shoot fast and straight, and one September night in 1942 they held the vital ridge in tropic darkness against Japanese humanwave assaults. Had the enemy broken through, Henderson Field could have been lost, and with it the Guadalcanal campaign.

Merrit Edson receive the Medal of Honor to wear with his Distinguished Rifleman badge and two Navy Crosses. A decade later, a retired major general and executive director of the NRA, he wrote a letter to the mothers of America.

Unfortunately, the letter no longer exists but I saw a copy in the 1980s. Basically, Red Mike said, “Mother, in wartime the military probably cannot teach your son to shoot well enough to save his life. The best thing you can do for him is to ensure that he learns to shoot a rifle as a boy.”

You’ve Shot a Gun—Are You Really Ready for Combat?

Page 67
In the Terror War (“the three-block war”) everybody needs to be trained to a combat standard because our truck drivers and supply people are almost as likely to be involved in a firefight as our infantrymen. Currently it’s not possible to train all personnel to the same level, owing to shortages of ammunition, ranges, instructions, and priorities.

The one item we’re not lacking is Official Indifference.

Unfortunately, far too many soldiers receive familiarization or qualification that passes for training. However, there is a difference—a huge one. It’s more than the distinction between a qualifying time at the Indy 500 and the ability to race in traffic.

It’s the difference between living and dying.

Faced with the impossibility of providing relevant training, the Rawhide syndrome kicks in: “Head ‘em up, move ‘em out.” Get the troops through The Course and we’ve done our job. It’s Miller time.

The real tragedy is that many of The Troops do not know the difference. Soldiers shoot a qualifying score on the indoor electronic range (similar to an arcade game) and honestly believe that they’re ready for combat.

So We have The Guns, But Will They Work?

Page 95
A senior noncom in central Iraq found that despite all the Bright Star exercises with Egypt, let alone the desert warfare training center in California, soldiers still were lubricating their rifles. “We knew before going over that Iraq has extremely fine sand like talcum powder,” the sergeant said. “But the Army was still telling us to lube the guns, and any kind of oil will attract dirt and grit that’ll jam the weapon after a while. Finally we took all the guns, broke ‘em down and dunked them in solvent. Then we wiped ‘em off, air dried them in a safe area, and ran ‘em with a dry lube. After that we had few problems.”

We’ll never know how many Americans died with inoperable weapons in their hands—probably few. But one is too many.

Pages 104–105
Far too many people assume that weapons always work—including people who rely upon them.

But think about it. If you went to work every day knowing that your life depended on one item, wouldn’t you become extremely attentive of that gadget?

Many people with a dress code do not. They assume that The System will look out for them. Promises that troops will receive some critical gear in-country almost never come true. Here’s a true-life example from Camp Cooke, Iraq, early 2006.
“First Sergeant, do you have dry lube?”

“Yes, of course I have dry lube.”

“Well, can I get some?”

“Specialist, I have my dry lube. I got my dry lube before we left For Bliss. I do not have enough for you or anybody else who didn’t pay attention.”

“Well, where can I get some?”

“I suggest that you write home. Have your folks send some. And ask for some batteries while you’re at it.”

“But that’ll take weeks!”

“Undoubtedly.”

That conversation—and variations upon the same theme—were shared repeatedly by personnel who have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. While it would be excessive to claim that shortages are endemic, it is accurate to say that they are common. One soldier reported that when his unit was extended in Iraq, the troops received no cleaning solvent or patches for eleven months. They obtained the items by “care package.”

In far too many instances, the unit level armorer system is broken. Soldiers report that scheduled service is duly reported on cards, but not performed because of too few parts and a lack of interest. Increasingly, soldiers are forced to rely upon their own resources, when such resources exist.

Here’s an email from a Vietnam veteran to his son in 2005. “Do not rely on your armorer. Good armorers are a delight, but most armorers are not gun guys. They are the supply guys with bad knees and a key to the door.”

Technology

Page 13
New submarines, stealth fighter, and futuristic land warfare systems have no war to fight—and have not had much opportunity for decades.

Page 14
Yes, we need to continue building high-tech (if not high-high tech) gear to be ready for the improbable scenario that takes us by surprise. We need to maintain our industrial base for aircraft and submarines to provide the material for a possible conventional war. But let’s be honest: the greater motivation is to keep congressmen and senators in residence in D.C. by providing their constituents with porcine projects. (It’s probably no accident that the F-22 Raptor is built by subcontractors in forty-six states and Puerto Rico.)

Page 28
America’s traditional strengths—sea and air power—are largely irrelevant to the war on terror. Stealth bombers and fast attack submarines (let alone boomers carrying Trident missiles) simply do not matter. Talk about all dressed up and no place to go.

More Reality, Less Rhetoric

Pages 141–142
After 9-11 President Bush and just about everyone else within reach of a microphone presumed to explain why Islamic fundamentalists act as they do. “They hate us for our freedom,” went the inevitable chant. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and disaffected Muslims of every stripe seemingly were willing to immolate themselves en route to Paradise because of America’s traditional liberties.

Place yourself in a jihadist’s sandals. For just a moment, think as he does. Why does he hate Americans so thoroughly, so viscerally? Because we have the right to speak our minds; to peaceably assemble; to bear arms; to receive equal justice under the law?

The question answers itself: a resounding Of course not!

Islamicists loathe the thought of America not because of its laws, but because of its actions offshore. Our enemies wish us ill because of what we do: because we stand on holy ground in Arabia; because we support Israel; because we invaded an Islamic nation that did not attack us. Many hate us for our culture: the insidious virus that America exports globally: everything from rap “music” to Levi’s to McDonald’s to women’s rights. The list is long but you get the idea…

And another thing. While we’re discussing rhetoric, we really-really need to get over the absurd notion of “cowardly suicide bombers.” There is, by definition, no such thing. (Having interviewed at least a couple hundred Allied veterans of the Pacific War, I have yet to meet one who mentions “cowardly kamikazes pilots.”) If any of the politicians who have denigrated Islamic suicide terrorists are willing to sacrifice themselves for whatever they claim to believe in, it’s a very well kept secret, stashed somewhere in that huge warehouse with the Ark of the Covenant.

We need to acknowledge that our enemies in the Terror War are highly motivated, demonstrably courageous, and often smart. (They pulled off 9-11 with 75 percent success, didn’t they?) To continue belittling them as back-stabbing cowards is merely to deceive ourselves. This is a long-long war—certainly it will last beyond the current generation—and the sooner we recognize that we face serious enemies, the better off we’ll be.

We Need Equal Justice

Pages 143–144
During 2002, Army MPs beat to death two Afghans chained to the ceiling of their cell. The commanding officer was charged with dereliction of duty and lying to investigators but only received a letter of reprimand and was released from active duty. Of the actual assailants, two were acquitted and two more were convicted of assault.

Two years later another Afghan detainee was murdered by seven Marines, only one of whom stood trial. Because medical evidence was lost or destroyed, he was convicted of assault and reduced to private with no time in jail. Conversely, the facility’s commanding officer accepted responsibility, pled guilty to dereliction of duty, and was discharged.

In Iraq during 2003 an Army warrant officer forced an Iraqi general with broken ribs into a sleeping bag, then smothered him to death. Through convicted of “negligent homicide,” the WO was merely fined and received a letter of reprimand.

The investigation of a 2004 dual homicide resulted in a lieutenant receiving immunity and subsequently awarded the Bronze Star.

Through 2006 various government and press investigations found that at least eighteen and perhaps thirty-four prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq had been killed by their jailers. That does not include battlefield incidents such as the alleged murders of civilians in Haditha, Iraq.

The foregoing examples, plus others, contrast vividly with the pattern in Vietnam. There, nearly 100 soldiers and twenty-seven Marines were convicted of murdering noncombatants, with Marine Corps sentences ranging from ten years to life.”

We Need “Prain Engrish”

Pages 151–152
During a Western Pacific naval exercise in the late 1970s, the American admiral commanding the endeavor sought to standardize communications with his allies. After much dismayed discussion of the U.S. Navy’s reliance upon Pentagon buzzwords and acronyms, a Japanese officer took the floor. In a plea for clarity, he asked, “Why cannot we just speak prain Engrish?”

It’s an atrocity. The language beloved of Shakespeare, Churchill, and Hemingway has been seized by soulless merchants and careerists who babble among themselves in Pentagonese, the arcane argot of the military-industrial-political complex.

Exactly how the mutation began may lie beyond reckoning, but clearly it could not have occurred without the conscious collaboration of hundreds (perhaps thousands) of willing conspirators.

Retired Army general and erstwhile Secretary of State Alexander Haig was often excoriated for his linguistic wanderings in “Haigspeak”. They included such examples as ‘terminological inexactitude’ (i.e., lying) but in retrospect they appear harmless enough, even colorful. “Rewickering” and contexted” may not appear in Webster’s or the OED, but at least the intent can be guessed at.

We Need Linguistics

Pages 178–179
We need not only linguistics in Arabic and Pasthto but people who understand those cultures—and others. Britain fought three Afghan wars in eighty years (1839-1919) and the Soviets were mired there almost a decade (1979-1989) before pulling out. We’ve been engaged since 2001 and the end is nowhere in sight. Obviously, we’re going to be there a long, long time, so we need a thorough understanding of the nation, its people, and its language.

There are far more Americans of Arabic descent than Afghan, so it’s easier to recruit soldiers for Iraqi service. Almost every soldier or Marine interviewed for the book said the same thing about Iraq: the ability to interact with the people is not only invaluable for any hope of a settlement there—it’s absolutely essential. While there have been isolated instances of American Muslim turning on their comrades, we cannot allow those episodes to deflect us from the greater need to make friends.

Solution: It’s obvious: increase the amount of foreign language training, but do so in both directions. While Americans are learning Arabic, Pashto, and other Islamic dialects, let’s spend some money on teaching some of those folks our brand of English. DOD already has a well-conceived language program for selected public schools; expand that worthy effort.

We Need Airlift and Tankers

Pages 196–197
If we’re going to have a “real” war, we’re going to have to get there in a hurry. The reason should be obvious: since we’re not going to start it, we’ll begin at a deficit much as we did in Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990. That means, in order to stabilize the situation, let alone reverse it, we require the long-range airlift to plug the whole in the dike while awaiting the heavy sealift and maritime pre-positioning assets.

We Need Hypersonics

Pages 197–198
Though some airmen and engineers salivate at the thought of a next-generation superfast manned bomber, there is simply no mission for it. As one Pentagon civilian notes, “A bomber or manned system of any sort is a non-starter precisely because it is hugely expensive and hugely complex, and hugely huge as well—probably bigger than the XB-70.” Truth be told, there’s precious little work for the manned bombers we currently own.

However, in Ralph Peters’ war of faith, flesh, and cities, there is still room for some high-high tech weapons. It has to do with TOT: time on target.

In the information age, we’re able to survey enormous areas of the earth’s surface in considerable detail. With some 3,000 unmanned drones in startling variety (as many as eighteen by one account), we have the potential to watch many of our enemies in real time, day or night.

That’s the good news.

The perennial bad news: it takes a while to act upon the intel.

The promising answer is hypersonic missiles couple with extreme precision guidance—weapons traveling well beyond three times the speed of sound that will pinwheel a Volkswagen.

We Need Helicopters

Page 200
More specifically, we need big, capable helicopters that can haul lots of cargo and troops at high altitude.

We need more Chinooks.

Depending on how you count it, the aged, venerable, and highly valued CH-47 has been around since the Eisenhower or Kennedy administration. Its replacement is not even on the drawing board. But it’s the go-to machine in Afghanistan, where the floor often is pegged at 8,000 feet and it’s uphill in both directions.

However, the existing airframes are old, tired, and in need of replacement.

Page 201
While we’re at it, we also need to replace the Air Force’s HH-60G Pave Hawk, which entered service in the early 1980s. Special operations unit require newer construction, and with expansions of SpecOps forces, they’re going to need more lift. And they’re used globally. In fact, two-thirds of the helo rescues in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath were accomplished by Pave Hawks. But due to continual demand and very high usage, most remaining HH-60Gs will reach their expected service life in 2007 to 2010.

For the optimum mission profile, combat rescue helos require thirty minutes on station 325 nautical miles from base, getting there at 135 knots. Says an Air Force operator, “We need these capabilities yesterday.”

The tactical world has been stood on its head, but once again, we need highly capable helicopters far, far more than we need new fighters.

Supply & Demand

Page 79
The pattern is reliable as sunrise. We go to war. We’re short of everything in-theater. Troops improvise as they always have. They get in trouble for circumventing The System. Eventually the supply pipeline catches up and troops are inundated with stuff: double and triple what they need or what they ordered. Corrections are made. More shortages arise. Push-pull; shove and tug. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen learn to play the logistics accordion.

There must be a better way. But in 230 years we have not found a way to change the situation. At least not for the better.

Page 93
For a variety of reasons, including NATO politics, the United States armed forces have shunned most home-grown firearms for decades. At this writing, both of our infantry machineguns as well as the standard sidearm are of European origin: Belgium and Italy, respectively. In some instances our service rifle has been made in Belgium and our ammunition is produced abroad because the military-industrial-political establishment would rather buy high-high-tech stuff than low-end gear such as small arms.

Whom Shall We Fight?

Pages 220–221
Wars between nations are becoming passé. Nobody is saying that it will not happen, but that’s the trend.

It’s for certain: in this century we will face two opponents—radical Islam and somebody else.

Since we’re already heavily engaged against the former, and will be for decades if not longer, perhaps that’s where we should place our focus.

Some background:

In 1900 Christians accounted for 27 percent of the human race; Muslims 12 percent. A century later the figures were 30 and 19; relative growths of 11 and 58 percent, respectively.

Once upon a time, Western troops could rely upon vastly greater firepower to offset a numerical deficit in battle. Nowhere was it better illustrated than the 1898 Battle of Omdurman when British and Egyptian forces chopped down thousands of Muslims near Khartoum.

The litany went:

“Whatever happens

We have got

The Maxim gun

And they have not.”

The Mahdi’s warriors fell in heaps to machine guns and artillery, with an entirely satisfactory kill-loss ratio of about 200 to one, in favor of the Brits.

Things are different now. Islam’s warriors have learned to fight us in other ways, but at rock bottom their greatest weapon remains their fertility. Not that the West is going to find itself cast against every Muslim or even every Muslim nation, but the faith’s increasing numbers assure a growing pool of dedicated enemies.

Let’s consider some specifics.

In the global campaign against Islamist states and entities, the West beings the contest with an inherent deficit: population growth. Islam is on the rise, especially in Africa. For instance, Sudan leads most nations with a 2.5 percent population growth per annum, a 34/1000 birth rate, and a 4.7 fertility rate (births per woman). Sudan is seventy percent Muslim.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and western European nations yield an annual population growth of well under one percent. (In Germany, it’s essentially flat-line at two-tenths of a percent.) In contrast, most Muslim countries add two percent annually, though Iran has a lower growth figure (1.1%) and birth rate (17/1000) than almost any Islamic society. Nevertheless, the Persian figures exceed the western democracies.

According to CIA figures, Muslim nations are producing more children than America and Europe by considerable margins. Consequently, many Islamic populations average half the age of the West. The net gain of those youngsters translates into more warriors. It takes less than eighteen years to grow a jihadist; sometimes a lot less.

In the twentieth century, world population grew from 1.65 to 6.06 billion, an increase of about three and a half times. During the same period, demographers reckon that Islam increased nearly five times.

So what do the demographics mean?

Page 222
Guessing the future: We will continue fighting Islam in ever greater numbers. However, it would be a mistake to assume that followers of The Prophet represent our only enemies. There are other ‘opponents’ on the horizon, and they are well known to one another.

We should recognize the potential of an alliance between Muslim entities such as al Qaeda and well established nation-states such as Iran and North Korea. While it could make for a messy display on DOD charts and graphs, with a lot of lines demonstrating unofficial lines of command and control, it might also reflect reality.

Sealing the Border

Pages 236–237
“Militarizing the border” is good for a cyber feud on most blogs and internet forums. But suffice to say that defending the nation from foreign intrusion is certainly within DOD’s realm, however much or little the armed forces may support the mission.

Determining the force needed to seal our borders is of course conjectural. To guard against conventional military invasion might require three million troops on the Mexican border alone, but that’s not the threat level. We are more concerned with catching or deterring hostile individuals or groups who illegally come here with something besides employment in mind.

In some areas it makes sense to employ National Guard or regular units as lookouts for La Migra. Presumably the basic asset would involve a small company per kilometer with perhaps some headquarters and support units.

Assume that two soldiers can adequately scan or patrol 100 meters or more per shift; three shifts equals a small, six-man squad, call it seven with a leader, or eight to ten to compensate for certain undermanning. A thirty-man platoon (three nine-man squads plus platoon leader, NCO and radioman) would then cover a kilometer per shift, or about 100 troops total, possibly a few more with a company HQ element or squad.

If the border is 3,000 kilometers, then 300,000 troops are need or maybe 10 percent more with minimal battalion, brigade, and division or higher echelons and support units. Since there’s no need for fire support and little for service support, formations would be much smaller than the normal combat allotments. However, with sufficient technology, probably we could use fewer troops, given technological aids (surveillance and sensors) plus physical barriers in some areas.

Where would we get 300,000 more troops, or even 100,000?

As the saying goes, “Hey, I’m Plans. You’re Operations.”

Meanwhile, we need to remember that putting military personnel on the border is not a substitute for adequate law enforcement. But the fly in the bureaucratic ointment becomes evident if you talk to Border Patrol agents, who for years have reported poor morale and retention. Aside from perennial under funding (USBP has one-tenth the people of NYPD) the agency frequently punishes or ousts agents from doing their job. Its internal feuding and dissent is, of course, beyond the scope of this study, if not beyond the realm of our concern.

Guessing the future: If the porous border cannot be sealed under a neoconservative Republican administration, it certainly will not be done under Democratic leadership. Therefore, the situation will remain unchanged until there’s an immigration related terrorist incident.

The Short Version

Pages 237–241
In order to condense the lessons and conclusions drawn in these pages, here’s “the short version.”

1) We’re spread thinly across the globe. As of 2005 a quarter million American service personnel were deployed overseas with another 100,000 routinely serving in Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan. They’re not all combat forces by any means, as humanitarian aid continues in “distressed” places such as Haiti (since 1994) and Kosovo (1999).

Therefore, let’s recognize that we’re short of troops and start planning accordingly. We talk about The Long War but continue assuming there will be some sort of “victory” in the foreseeable future. Maybe there will, but that’s happy-puppy optimism, not detached realism. At some point we will have three options: continue exhausting our all-volunteer force; cut back severely on overseas commitments and bring most people home; or augment the regulars with a combination of more Guard and Reserve and/or a limited draft.

Unpopular? Definitely

Politically impossible? Probably. But we need a lot fewer Republicans and Democrats and a lot more Americans in government.

In a conventional war we’ll still inherit most of the problems we face in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shortages in maintenance, airlift, basic equipment, and especially proper training for all troops will be an even greater challenge in any “real” war scenario. The time to start fixing that perennial problem was approximately twenty years ago.

Let’s saddle up and put the spurs to that pony.

2) Buy what we demonstrably need now more than what we may never use later. This book has repeatedly examined the inverse relationship between Pentagon purchases and troop requirements. Yes, we should plan for other contingencies, but while we’re focused on World War IV (against a major conventional power or powers) let’s not forget about World War III—the one we’re engaged in today, however our “conflicts” are numbered.

As long as Americans continue going to war zones with inadequate training, support, and equipment, parents and voters should demand changed of the military-industrial-political complex. While it’s barely conceivable that someday we’ll actually use stealth fighters and next-generation submarines, the fact remains that our sons and daughters are engaged in gunfights today and will be tomorrow and next year.

As already noted, “Business as usual” represents a losing philosophy

3) Acknowledge the likely development of ICBMs funded by Islamic governments and other petro dollars, and continue investing in ballistic missile defenses. The “Star Wars” debate of the 1970s and 1980s has been settled—antiballistic missiles (ABMs) are needed but remain controversial in some quarters. The current Patriot system can work against aircraft and tactical missiles such as Scud, but is not intended to destroy far more capable ICBMs arriving from outside the atmosphere. Therefore, we need to continue developing advanced ABMs for the Missile Defense Agency, plus airborne lasers, or both. ABMs do not, of course, prevent “suitcase” or “backpack” nukes from being deployed, and those low-end weapons may represent the greater threat.

One of the surface navy’s most urgent missions could be missile defense with Aegis destroyers or cruisers deployed off Korea and elsewhere. (Ships always possess the advantage of “territorial independence,” freeing us from dealing with wavering allies.) ABMs include sea-based SS-2s and land-based Kinetic Energy Projectiles, both of which merit continued development.

Similarly, invest in hypersonic weapons able to take advantage of real-time intelligence and distant targets. For example, if satellites or other sources show North Korea or Iran ready to launch a warhead, we need to destroy that bird on the ground in minutes, not hours. If we have to “defund” (that’s probably a DOD word) some mysterious projects to obtain hypersonics, by all means do so. At the same time, we should be looking at ways to defeat hypersonics coming our way, because some day—they will. At Mach five or more, speed equals range: a launch beyond our early detection sensors degrades our ability to intercept. That’s indicative of the high-low threat: AK-47’s and IEDs couple with high-Mach missiles and stealthy submarines.

4) Drop the political correctness and admit the obvious: we are engaged in a long-term conflict with Islam. No other threat is currently as great, and if that means “profiling,” so be it.

The focus of the Terror War is geographically contradictory. As a global movement, al Qaeda can choose anyplace on earth to launch its next strike. That situation forces America and the West to disperse their forces, trying to remain strong everywhere. It’s a losing proposition. On 9-11 we were strong nowhere, least of all in New York and D.C.

In order to fight Muslim fundamentalists, it is necessary—it is essential—to understand their culture, faith, and languages. Fortunately, the U.S. and other Western combatants are allied with friendly forces in many Islamic countries. But how far any of them will go in opposing fellow Muslims remains to be seen—especially where economics hold sway.

Meanwhile, our greatest need is intelligence. However, over the years, some politicians have either naively or darkly sought to prevent U.S. intelligence from obtaining information from various shady characters. (Now-deceased Senator Frank Church of Idaho is most frequently cited, as his 1978 legislation turned intelligence gathering from electronic and other sources at the expense of “humint.”) In the twenty-first century, anyone who clings to the concept of “good guys only” probably has no business in the intelligence community. Frequently we gain information by appealing to the opposition’s self interest, not its higher values—as they do to us. (Street cops will tell you that the feds most often crack cases by throwing money at the target mob and seeing who picks up the cash.)

In short, we need the best information we can obtain by any means.

5) Stop supporting North Korea. Pyongyang is one of the very few nation-states posing a serious risk to America, and the inane notion that providing food, fuel and nukes would calm a rabid Stalinist regime was clearly doomed to anybody with two gray cells to rub together. If the rest of the world wants to support the Kim dynasty, at least we do not have to contribute to our own problems. The logical conclusion to be drawn from three presidential administrations supporting North Korea can only be extortion: “Keep feeding us or we’ll attack.” Instead of ceding the obvious, we propped up Pyongyang under the guise of “engagement” and “humanitarian assistance.” As if any of the food intended for North Korea’s starving population would ever reach the needy.

Granted, our options are limited. As long as Seoul wants to play patty-cake with Pyongyang, we’re not going to invade and we’re not likely to take unilateral action. But at some point well have to decide whether to get along with our allies or defend ourselves against a determined, growing threat. If our eventual action forces hordes of refugees into China and South Korea, that’s far preferable to a nuke on Honolulu or Seattle.

In any case, appeasers get what they deserve. And that includes the United States of America.

The Price

Pages 243–244
Walter Reed Army Medical Center faces Georgia Avenue in Northwest Washington, D.C. It’s not for the faint hearted.

A friend of mine—a veteran in his seventies—often goes there. Following is a brief account of one visit by one old soldier offering support to one young man suddenly grown old.

“He’s a really good kid, just nineteen. An IED got him. It destroyed his face and one eye, and left him blind in the other. It’s a good thing. If he could see in a mirror he’d probably off himself.

“He wears a mask most of the time just as a courtesy to the staff. I don’t think that most of the soldiers there from Iraq or Afghanistan would ever say anything.

“I made friends with the kid—he was actually eager to talk. As combat vets we share a bond, though his war was a lot shorter than mine. I finished my tour in Korea but he was only in Iraq a few weeks.

“I asked if he’d like to go outside, and he said he would. He likes the breeze when it’s blowing because the mask gets warm indoors. But just as soon as I led him down the steps he took of his mask without warning me. Two women were coming up the sidewalk, and they gasped out loud. The kid heard them and I think he was a little embarrassed but that’s impossible to tell from his expression. I mean, my god he doesn’t have an expression.

“He asked me to take him back inside. I did, and said I’d come see him again soon.

“And I will.”

The final prediction in this chapter can be made with dreadful certainty: there will be thousands more visits in the years and decades ahead. Therefore, moral support for our casualties and their families will continue ranking high on the lengthening list of what we need.