For more information: Talking PointsBattling for Hearts and Minds: A Firsthand Experience The next morning... I brought the battalion into the village and put the soldiers to work. Within hours, the school looked like new. I was so proud of their effort. One of the most memorable moments of the war was when a young child asked if we would lift him up to remove Saddam's picture from the wall. The moment was priceless—a seven-year-old pulling Saddam's picture down. Such an act of defiance assured me that we were doing the right thing. A huge lunch was prepared to honor my soldiers and me. For us, there was no doubt we would win the war. The question was whether we could continue to win the trust of the people. (page 32) * * * You've heard the complaint that this kind of good news doesn't get reported often enough. And that's true. But it's important for another reason beyond morale at home. This matters in Iraq even more than here because Iraq has been an occupied land since 579 BC, and this gives Iraqis a different worldview from the West. We can say to the Iraqis that we are not just another occupying force, but their experience and history tell them otherwise. We have to understand that mindset if we are to become, to the Iraqi people, more than just another link in a long chain of occupiers—we have to earn their trust in profound ways. And that's why these stories ought to be told far more often than they are. Not to make America look good—though that helps, of course—but to demonstrate our intentions by way of our actions, and in a clear and unambiguous way. The Turning Point Against America If there was a singular turning point, it was Ambassador Bremer's announcement that the Coalition was an occupier in May 2003. He called for the complete de-Ba'athification of the top four levels of government along with the immediate dissolution of the military. The sweeping changes were instantaneous. It was as if someone flipped a switch, and all the trust we'd built up was lost. The Iraqis felt betrayed, and their support for the coalition immediately waned, turning instead into hostility. This shift in terminology from guests to occupiers caused a backlash that was, in retrospect, inevitable, given Iraq's history and culture. (page 76) * * * Of course there could have been better planning for the post-war period—but hindsight always gives us a better way to do things in any situation. What happened here is another example of what I believe was our greatest error: our failure to appreciate—perhaps in some cases, even to be aware of—the fact that this is an area that has been perpetually occupied. We were going to be seen as occupiers when we came in. That doesn't mean their trust could not be won, or that some would not see us as liberators immediately. But after this announcement, I spoke to many sheiks as well as average citizens and they wanted to know why we had "tricked" them into taking over their country. The term "occupier" was required by the international community so aid and security could flow—it was a bureaucratic and diplomatic term. But to the Iraqis, all it sounded like was doubletalk. Words have very particular meanings, and the minute we described ourselves as "occupiers," with all that word means to the Iraqis, we undid a lot of good that had been done. Something We Should Have Done Differently: Dismantling Militias While it may have been difficult, we should have forced the dismantling of the Shiite and Kurdish militias. The Associated Press reported the actions of these militias, but I personally read the assassination lists ... and witnessed the destruction caused by these militias. These armed groups operate independently and with total disregard for the government seated in Baghdad. They carried out the agendas of their respective parties, not to mention individual objectives. The attempt to have them operate as part of the Iraqi government security forces was a good plan, but we should have insisted that they be fully integrated into an Iraqi national force and should have not allowed them to stay as intact operating units with full autonomy. These militias have conducted assassinations, kidnappings, and committed numerous acts of intimidation on the government and the public. Even today, they continued their attempt at consolidating their control over northern and southern Iraq. (page 230-1) * * * We needed to have greater control over these armed groups. I believe that by doing it the way we did, we were trying to give the Iraqis as much autonomy as quickly as possible—which is what we ought to do, and what, frankly, many anti-war groups in America are clamoring for. But this is a good lesson in what happens when you try to do the right thing without regard to the whole picture: we ended up with thugs and bandits running around killing, stealing, and kidnapping, and having been given government approval—at least at the start—to go out and enforce their own brand of justice. It was a mistake, no question, but it's also an example of what can happen if you fail to think through the consequences of simply throwing off the dictator and saying, "Here you are, have at it, you're in charge." It turns out that you can't just declare victory and go home. A lot of good Iraqi people were and still are fighting a lot of bad guys who have a lot of power. Our Definition of Democracy Is Not Iraq's Definition of Democracy The majority of Iraqis want freedom and democracy, but we in the West may not fully understand or necessarily agree with the Iraqi definitions of these terms. For Iraqis, the true meaning of freedom is that they can choose what democracy means for them. The concern of course is that those in power might create a government that will be as repressive as its predecessor, and the people will be forced into something worse than they had before. (page 230) * * * Democracy in and of itself will not create peace and stability, but it is the most reliable—most realistic and most respecting of human rights—way to maintain peace. People have to want their government and their way of life. They have to want peace. And to be able to act on what they want, they must be allowed to govern themselves. But as I say, self-government does not always lead to wise government. Self-government—if you can keep it—is the most stable government, however, because sooner or later the people win out. So as we move toward self-government in Iraq, we need to work as hard as possible on educating people about the likely outcomes of the choices they can make as they create that government. Because, quite obviously, some choices are good, some are bad, and some can be deadly. We have to stay and help finish what we started. We can't just cross our fingers, declare ourselves victorious and go home. It won't end pleasantly for anybody. Radicals Have Often Used Religion to Foment Hate and Hide Their True Agenda The likes of Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi thrive on validation from world media. These and other international criminals have successfully exploited Islam in the same twisted way the Ku Klux Klan uses Christianity—all in an attempt to justify their prejudices and criminal acts. We need to stop labeling these criminals Islamic terrorists and simply call them the terrorists or criminals that they are. Attaching religious labels alienates millions of God-loving people and gives these criminals a level of prominence among their followers. The majority of Muslims in the world are peaceful people. (page 232) * * * Islam is not the enemy. Some evil people are taking advantage of Muslim beliefs and Muslim believers. Combined with Middle Eastern cultures in which Islam and subservience to leadership are major factors, combined with a formula for conflating a fascist enemy who uses religious rhetoric with an entire religion and a Western culture that really does not understand the East, we have a recipe for disaster. When we equate Islam with the enemy, we are clouding the situation for ourselves, and needlessly separating ourselves from God-loving people who ought to be our allies. Of course, this is something that our despot enemies are counting on, too. Religion Should Unite Us, Not Divide Us I told the villagers who invited me to pray in the mosque that we all pray to the same God, and we both ask for victory. The difference is that I pray on my knees and you pray on your hands and knees. Our God, however, hears both of our prayers. I often wonder what God thinks of all of us asking for the same thing but from opposite standpoints. (page 235) * * * As I mention in the book, this is not a war against Islam. This is a war against an enemy that takes advantage of purposeful misunderstanding of Islam. This applies to the people they fool in the Middle East and to the people in the West who are often left with little to focus their anger on other than Islam. Al-Zarqawi, who is off the field now, and bin Laden use our lack of understanding about Islamic culture and religion against us. They violate the teachings of the Qur'an even as they tell the world that theirs is the true meaning of Islam, and they use this as cover for a political or power agenda. Terror Is Only a Method, And It Does Not Completely Define The Problem As we define what we expect the outcome for this war to be, we must reevaluate who, or what, it is we are fighting. To say we are fighting terror is like defining World War II as a war against the Japanese suicide pilots—the Kamikazes. Terror is only a method, like criminals who use gang tactics to control the streets. ... We must understand that the terrorists have a more overarching strategy. We continue to diagnose the symptoms but not the disease. We believe that the terrorists' aims are to take away the freedom that we all hold so dear. We have diagnosed this threat as terrorism, not what it is—a truly worldwide insurgency. (page 1) * * * Terrorism is a tactic. The enemy is an ideology based on fascism. These are very different things. To label our enemy as terrorism would be a lot like looking at 9/11 and labeling our enemy as airplane hijackers. Terrorism is a method. Domination is the goal. Fascism is the ideology—and the defeat of this aggressive fascism is what we seek. The Grave Danger of Pulling Back There will always be the "armchair generals" who believe it is time to call the team from the field. For them, I suggest they stop for a moment and recognize that the threat to freedom in the world is real. There is definitely a movement by extremists to create a world of anarchy and fear. Under the cloak of religious duty, these men deliver anti-American messages to stir the emotions of the weak-minded and cold-hearted to attack an enemy that is not their enemy at all. (page 251) * * * I believe that many of those who want us to pull back from the effort in Iraq underestimate the threat we face. Our enemy is an aggressive fascism—notice that I didn't say terrorism or Islamic fascism, because to narrow it with those adjectives is in one case to needlessly limit our focus, and in the other to simply confuse the issue. This fascism is not bound to a single nation-state. We have to fight it where we find it, and try to prevent it from appearing on our shores with any great frequency. Furthermore, we are not fighting a rational enemy with whom we can sit at the diplomatic table and negotiate a truce, much less peace or our own safety. They aspire to coerced domination and the suppression of the most basic human rights. If you doubt it, look at the Taliban or Saddam's reign, or how things are in Iraq right now. Our enemy is fighting a war without borders and they have significant financial support against people who in many cases have no one to help them fight back except us. They exploit fear and ignorance on the promise of delivering some measure of pride, security or material gain—but they have yet to deliver any of these things to those they entice. They have no interest in helping people. They want to rule them, and with an iron fist. And history—even recent history—bears this out. America's Responsibility to Iraq and the World The Coalition went to Iraq, regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the reasons. We toppled an oppressive regime and, as a nation, now have a moral responsibility to finish what we started. If we left today, the country of Iraq would fall into civil war. The western deserts of Iraq would become a safe haven for training areas for insurgents and terrorists. The sanctuary of their new home would allow them to train new fighters who would find their way to the heartland of America along with other cities in the Western world. These new fighters would do their best to surpass their predecessors in the awe of September 11, 2001.
The fact is, whether the Iraqis want us in their country or whether the citizens of the United States want us out, for the security of the Middle East and the rest of the world, we have to stay and finish what we started. The failure to understand this on the part of those who want us to leave demonstrates that they do not appreciate the impact America's departure would have on not just Irq, but on the United States too. Before anyone calls for our withdrawal from Iraq, let him sit with a fanatic who is hell bent to kill him and they will soon realize that for the safety of future generations of Americans and Iraqis, we must stay and finish the job we started. (page 251) * * * If we pull out and leave this to the forces now loose in that country, spectacular oppression is going to win out. I know there are people who believe that America is the real oppressor, but hear me out: I've lived, worked and fought in Iraq, I have seen my friends, both American and Iraqi die for their beliefs, and there is not a person with that experience who would agree in any way, shape or form that the oppressors behind the insurgency are somehow a better choice—are somehow fighting for justice and freedom. We're talking about murderers, kidnappers, and people who rain down violence because they don't like your ethnicity or your religion—and that doesn't even count the times they do it simply for the pleasure of holding sway over someone else. There's no nobility in being part of the insurgency. It's about power. To believe otherwise is, quite simply, not a serious opinion to hold. We Must Understand the Culture in Order to Interact We must become proactive in our communication. That means doing more than simply sharing the "good news" of reconstruction; we must also counter the insincere religious overtones of our adversaries with convincing, unified messages. These counter-messages must circulate to the insurgency's five target audiences, which are 1) the insurgency's supporters; 2) Iraqi non-supporters and/or undecided; 3) U.S. and Coalition policy makers; 4) U.S. citizens, who influence the decisions of policy makers; and 5) neutral countries. (page 257) * * * These are the groups whose decisions and actions have direct and in many cases immediate impact on what happens on the ground. So we can't approach this casually, or treat it like an American public relations campaign. There are times and places for those kinds of approaches, but this situation is special not only because of what's at stake but, in practice, because we have to be speaking the same cultural language as those we're trying to persuade and those we're trying to counter. Those who develop the messages for these audiences are working in direct opposition to the overt and covert efforts of the insurgency, so the message-creators must be versant in Islam and Middle Eastern culture. My book documents a fraction of the many times a situation was turned around—or a life was saved, often mine—because I or my people understood and respected the religion of Islam, could quote the Qur'an, or knew that local conceptions of honor, pride or tradition were the critical factors.
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