The Sling and The Stone
On War in the 21st Century

By Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC / Zenith Press
Price: $24.95
ISBN: 0-7603-2059-4
Pub Date: October 2004

 

 

For more information:
Callie R. Oettinger, callie@o-a-inc.com
Ph: 703-451-2476, Fax: 703-451-6870

Warfare by
SLING AND STONE


The American Military Goliath Should Be Worried that the World’s Davids Have Found a Sling and Stone that Work


David's sling-and-stone fight against Goliath isn't that far from Iraqi insurgents fighting against coalition forces. In fact, around the world, insurgents such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and those responsible for the deaths of hundreds in Beslan, Russia, have found, properly aimed and strongly thrown, their small stones can bring down Goliath.

"The kidnappings and beheadings led by insurgents such as Zarqawi, the slow-but-steady rise in U.S. casualties, the constant bombings, and the attacks on oil production facilities, are all part of an effort to break the United States' will and convince political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit," says Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, author of The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 st Century .  

"While not as dramatic as the devastating attacks of 9-11, these attacks may be more damaging in the long term. By wearing down the will of the American people, the insurgents put pressure on U.S. decision makers in Congress," says Hammes. "A U.S. soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the images of the smoking ruin of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, and a naked Vietnamese girl fleeing a napalmed village immediately impacted the United States' policies in those countries. Insurgents around the world know this."

"In Beslan, Russia," says Hammes, "the message of the insurgents who attacked the school is: If you want your children to be safe, free Chechnya." In Spain, the March Madrid train bombing effected the outcome of the country's election, which then led to Spain's withdrawal from Iraq. In the same way, the actual targets of the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan are the U.S. government and voters.

While the Department of Defense (DOD) pushes for a Goliath, technology-driven war machine, the insurgents are successfully practicing sling-and-stone, low-tech, fourth generation warfare (4GW), relying on networks of people over high-tech weapons, to directly attacks the minds of our decision makers. They know they cannot defeat America's military. Instead of challenging the United States militarily, they use 4GW and make daily use of television, newspapers and the internet to broadcast their attacks to reach the U.S decision makers—the targets are not only the executive and legislative branches but also the voters.   They even provide the video footage.

The Sling and the Stone explores the evolution and current practice of 4GW and explains why 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. "Fourth generation warfare has repeatedly worked against superior powers—against the United States in Vietnam, Somalia and Lebanon; against the USSR in Afghanistan and Chechnya; against France in Vietnam and Algeria; and against Israel in Lebanon," says Hammes. Insurgents drove a vastly superior military force out of the contested territories, without beating the opponents' armed forces.

In the February 2000 edition of the al Qaeda-sponsored online magazine "Al-Ansar," Ubeid Al-Qurashi, one of bin Laden's close aides wrote: "In 1989, some American military experts predicted a ... kind of warfare they called 'the fourth generation of wars.'.... In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen triumphed ... Similarly, a single Somali tribe humiliated America ...   A short time later, the Chechen Mujahideen humiliated and defeated the Russian bear. After that, the Lebanese resistance [Hizbullah] expelled the Zionists army from southern Lebanon.... Thus, it appears that there are precedents for world powers and large countries being defeated by [small] units of Mujahideen . . . .

Mao started this form of war, and each practitioner since has learned from his predecessors or co-combatants in various places in the world and refined its techniques. Faced with enemies they could not beat using conventional war, 4GW warriors have sought a different path. The anti-coalition forces in Iraq, the Taliban, the Chechnyans and the al-Qaeda network are simply the latest to use the tactics and techniques that have been developing for decades.

DOD's failure to address the importance of information dominance over technology dominance is like the emperor's failure to realize he has no new clothes. The warfare has evolved just as the world has evolved from an industrial society to an information one. Information collection against today's threats requires investment in human skills rather than technology. DOD's "clothes" have no substance. "DOD's high-tech model, doctrine, organization, training, and education serve only to teach people to take advantage of technology—not to think about, fight, and win wars," says Hammes

"War has entered a new phase," says Hammes. "The fact that only unconventional or 4GW has succeeded against superpowers should be a key element in discussing the evolution of war. Unfortunately, it has been largely absent from the debate within the U.S. Department of Defense."