
The Sling and The Stone
On War in the 21st Century
By Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC / Zenith Press
Price: $24.95
ISBN: 0-7603-2059-4
Pub Date: October 2004
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For more information:
Callie R. Oettinger, callie@o-a-inc.com
Ph: 703-451-2476, Fax: 703-451-6870
Warfare by
SLING AND STONE
The American Military Goliath Should Be Worried that
the World’s Davids Have Found a Sling and Stone that Work
David's sling-and-stone fight against Goliath isn't that far from Iraqi
insurgents fighting against coalition forces. In fact, around the world,
insurgents such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and those responsible for the
deaths of hundreds in Beslan, Russia, have found, properly aimed and
strongly thrown, their small stones can bring down Goliath.
"The kidnappings and beheadings led by insurgents such as Zarqawi, the
slow-but-steady rise in U.S. casualties, the constant bombings, and the
attacks on oil production facilities, are all part of an effort to break
the United States' will and convince political decision makers that their
strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived
benefit," says Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, author of The
Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 st Century .
"While not as dramatic as the devastating attacks of 9-11, these attacks
may be more damaging in the long term. By wearing down the will of the
American people, the insurgents put pressure on U.S. decision makers
in Congress," says Hammes. "A U.S. soldier being dragged through the
streets of Mogadishu, the images of the smoking ruin of the U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut, and a naked Vietnamese girl fleeing a napalmed village
immediately impacted the United States' policies in those countries.
Insurgents around the world know this."
"In Beslan, Russia," says Hammes, "the message of the insurgents who
attacked the school is: If you want your children to be safe, free Chechnya." In
Spain, the March Madrid train bombing effected the outcome of the country's
election, which then led to Spain's withdrawal from Iraq. In the same
way, the actual targets of the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan are
the U.S. government and voters.
While the Department of Defense (DOD) pushes for a Goliath, technology-driven
war machine, the insurgents are successfully practicing sling-and-stone,
low-tech, fourth generation warfare (4GW), relying on networks of people
over high-tech weapons, to directly attacks the minds of our decision
makers. They know they cannot defeat America's military. Instead of challenging
the United States militarily, they use 4GW and make daily use of television,
newspapers and the internet to broadcast their attacks to reach the U.S
decision makers—the targets are not only the executive and legislative
branches but also the voters. They even provide the video footage.
The Sling and the Stone explores the evolution
and current practice of 4GW and explains why 4GW does not attempt to
win by defeating the enemy's military forces. "Fourth generation warfare
has repeatedly worked against superior powers—against the United
States in Vietnam, Somalia and Lebanon; against the USSR in Afghanistan
and Chechnya; against France in Vietnam and Algeria; and against Israel
in Lebanon," says Hammes. Insurgents drove a vastly superior military
force out of the contested territories, without beating the opponents'
armed forces.
In the February 2000 edition of the al Qaeda-sponsored online magazine "Al-Ansar," Ubeid
Al-Qurashi, one of bin Laden's close aides wrote: "In 1989, some
American military experts predicted a ... kind of warfare they called
'the fourth generation of wars.'.... In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen triumphed
... Similarly, a single Somali tribe humiliated America ... A
short time later, the Chechen Mujahideen humiliated and defeated the
Russian bear. After that, the Lebanese resistance [Hizbullah] expelled
the Zionists army from southern Lebanon.... Thus, it appears that there
are precedents for world powers and large countries being defeated by
[small] units of Mujahideen . . . .
Mao started this form of war, and each practitioner since has learned
from his predecessors or co-combatants in various places in the world
and refined its techniques. Faced with enemies they could not beat using
conventional war, 4GW warriors have sought a different path. The anti-coalition
forces in Iraq, the Taliban, the Chechnyans and the al-Qaeda network
are simply the latest to use the tactics and techniques that have been
developing for decades.
DOD's failure to address the importance of information dominance over
technology dominance is like the emperor's failure to realize he has
no new clothes. The warfare has evolved just as the world has evolved
from an industrial society to an information one. Information collection
against today's threats requires investment in human skills rather than
technology. DOD's "clothes" have no substance. "DOD's high-tech model,
doctrine, organization, training, and education serve only to teach people
to take advantage of technology—not to think about, fight, and
win wars," says Hammes
"War has entered a new phase," says Hammes. "The fact that only unconventional
or 4GW has succeeded against superpowers should be a key element in discussing
the evolution of war. Unfortunately, it has been largely absent from
the debate within the U.S. Department of Defense."
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